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Definitions 
Prescriptive models are those which are designed to help people make 
"better" decisions, in the sense of aiding them to behave consistently, with 
an a priori set of requirements or rules with which they want their choices to 
conform. These models are "prescriptive" or "normative" insofar as they 
prescribe how one should behave; that is, they set ideal norms. Descriptive 
models, on the other hand, are designed to describe how people actually 
behave. Both types of models allow for the assessment of expectations or 
beliefs about the structure of the environment, and about utilities which refer 
to personal tastes. 
In a treatise on the problem of measurement of values and probabilities 
for the purpose of predicting behavior, Churchman' ties together the pre-
scriptive and the descriptive aspects of choice in decision situations, main-
taining that prescription should emanate from prediction: 
The present suggestion is to assert that the "ought" in a recom-
mendation can be stated as follows: "X ought to do A in this 
environment" means "X would do A in the standard environment 
that defines value measurement." If a scientist states that an 
executive should follow a certain course of action, he says in 
effect, "I have measured the values of the executive—or his 
organization—for the various outcomes that may result from his 
decisions." These measurements predict what he would do if 
he were making his decision under the standard conditions of 
value measurements. When I say he ought to exhibit such-and-
such behavior, I mean that this is the behavior he would exhibit 
if these standard conditions held. Of course, he may not do what 
he ought to do; that is, the standard conditions may not hold in 
this environment. 
1 C. W. Churchman, Prediction and Optimal Decision (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), pp. 17-18. 
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If the prescriptive models were to take into consideration the human 
capability to process information and the tendency to "simplify" and elim-
inate part of the stimuli in the environment—then the "prescriptive" model 
becomes a descriptive model of actual behavior, as Becker and McClintock2 
indicate. They note that "imposing a requirement that a prescriptive model 
be realistic in its demands upon the users' capabilities tends to make the 
distinction between prescriptive and descriptive models ambiguous."3 
The descriptive and the normative models of behavior may require a 
common set of accounting data. However, they may differ in their input 
requirements. If so, accounting objectives based on descriptive behavior 
would require sets of data that are different on occasions from those required 
for accounting objectives based on normative or prescriptive models of 
behavior. 
Illustrations—Investment Analysis 
To illustrate the above, the discussion is restricted to one sub-set of 
users—security analysts. 
Many aspects of investment analysis are viewed as psychological in 
nature and one of these aspects is certainly the appraisal of man's capabilities 
for integrating information into a judgment or a decision. The analysts are 
called upon to make predictions, forecasts, diagnoses and evaluations on 
the basis of fallible information and with respect to parameters such as 
expected returns, growth rates, variability and volatility. These tasks are 
said to be facilitated by means of the statistics discipline. Very often, how-
ever, individuals bypass formal statistical procedures when making judg-
ments. When they do this, they are acting as "intuitive statisticians." 
The normative aspect of investment analysis relates to decision rules 
that should be applied to a variety of investment situations taking advantage 
of theoretically derived or empirically determined quantitative relationships 
between market factors and security performance. Do security analysts use 
these normative models as prescribed? 
While research in this area is almost nonexistent, related questions have 
been studied extensively within psychology and other disciplines (primarily 
medicine). Various techniques from these other disciplines were employed 
to identify and describe the descriptive models of financial decision-making. 
Geoffry Clarkson4 simulated the portfolio selection processes of a bank's 
trust investment officer. Clarkson studied the officer's verbalized reflections 
as he was asked to think aloud while reviewing past and present decisions. 
Using these reflections as a guide, the investment process was translated into 
a sequential branching computer program. A remarkable correspondence 
2 Becker and McClintock, "Behavioral Decision Theory," Annual Review of Psy-
chology (1967). 
3 Ibid, p. 241. 
4 G. P. E. Clarkson, Portfolio Selection: A Simulation of Trust Investment (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962). 
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was found between the simulated portfolios and the actual future portfolios 
selected by the trust officer. Similar research plans were used by Cohen, 
Gilmore, and Singer5 in simulating the decision processes of bank officers 
who granted loans. Other attempts to analyze the judgment process in 
medical diagnosis are described by Kleinmuntz6 and Rimoldi.7 
Techniques that are less complex than Clarkson's simulation but more 
sophisticated than the naïve approach of simply asking the decision-maker 
how he makes his judgments were developed. These are discussed by 
Goldberg,8 Slovic and Lichtenstein,9 Hoffman,10 Hammond, Hursch, and 
Todd.11 This approach requires making quantitative evaluations of a large 
number of cases each of which is described by various cue dimensions. 
Thus the financial analysts could be asked to predict price appreciation for 
securities that are defined in terms of P/E ratios, earnings, dividend yields, 
etc. Hoffman and Hammond, Hursch, and Todd suggested fitting a regression 
equation to analysts' judgments to capture their personal weighting policy, 
within the framework of a linear model. 
Also, information processing sometimes utilizes cues in a variety of 
nonlinear ways (e.g., in curvilinear functions). When analysts associate good 
investment decisions with complex and interrelated decision rules they prob-
ably are thinking in terms of configural relationships rather than linear. 
Studies of Probabilistic Processing 
Some attempts to detect deviations of the descriptive from the normative 
centered on the prescriptive models of decision theory which assert that 
opinions about the world should be cast in probabilistic terms. For example, 
according to the prescriptive model, rather than predicting that a stock will 
sell at a specific price, we should estimate a probability distribution across 
a set of possible prices. These probabilities can be used together with the 
5 K. J. Cohen, T. C. Gilmore, and F. A. Singer, "Bank Procedures for Analyzing Busi-
ness Loan Appl icat ions," Analytical Methods in Banking (Homewood, Ill inois: R. D. 
Irwin, 1966), pp. 218-251. 
6 B. Kleinmuntz, "The Processing of Clinical Information by Man and Machine," 
Formal Representation of Human Judgment (New York: Wiley, 1968), pp. 149-186. 
7 H. J. A. Rimoldi, "Teaching and Analysis of Diagnostic Skil ls," The Diagnostic 
Process (Ann Arbor: Malloy Lithographing, 1964), pp. 315-346. 
8 L. R. Goldberg, "Simple Models or Simple Processes? Some Research on Clinical 
Judgments," American Psychologist (1968), Vol. 23, pp. 483-496. 
9 P. Slovic and S. Lichtenstein, "Compar ison of Bayesian and Regression Ap-
proaches to the Study of Information Processing in Judgment," Organizational Be-
havior and Human Performance (in press) and Human Judgment and Social Interaction 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, in press). 
10 P. J. Hoffman, "The Paramorphic Representation of Clinical Judgment," Psycho-
logical Bulletin (1960), Vol. 57, pp. 116-131. 
11 K. R. Hammond, C. J. Hursch, and F. J. Todd, "Analyzing the Components of 
Clinical Inference," Psychological Review (1964), Vol. 71, pp. 438-456. 
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information about the payoffs associated with the various decisions and states 
of the world to satisfy an objective criterion such as the maximization of ex-
pected value or expected utility. 
When new information is gained the probabilities are revised. The 
normative model that prescribes how such revision is to be made is Bayes' 
theorem. However, psychologists, led by Ward Edwards and others12 found 
experimentally that men are conservative processors of information. While 
upon receipt of new data, subjects revised their posterior probability esti-
mates in the same direction as prescribed by Bayes' theorem, the revision 
was typically too small; subjects responded as though the data were less 
diagnostic than they truly were. Edwards suggested that while they perceive 
each datum accurately, men are unable to combine its meaning properly 
with the prior probabilities when revising their opinions.13 
Assessments of Probability, Variability 
And Co-variability 
The prescriptive portfolio models require that analysts estimate the 
variances and co-variances of expected returns which are then combined to 
optimize the investors' utility.14 For such a model to be actually used, there-
fore, estimates of probabilities and variances must be provided. But if it is 
found that the estimation of such parameters is affected by factors that are 
not specified by the normative models or if they are distorted systematically 
as a result of intervening psychological variables, then the prescribed port-
folio model in which such estimates are to be used may no longer be the 
optimal model. In this case, modification of the prescriptive model will be 
required to accommodate the human tendencies. In such a case the informa-
tion requirements implied by the first normative model may differ from those 
implied by the modified descriptive model. 
Such distortions were indeed found. For example, Tversky and Kahne-
man15 identified an "availability bias" in that judgments of an event's prob-
ability were found to be determined by the number of instances of that event 
that are remembered and the ease with which they come into mind. The 
12 W. Edwards, "Conservatism in Human Information Processing," Formal Represen-
tation of Human Judgment (New York: Wiley, 1968), pp. 17-52. W. Edwards, H. Lind-
man, and L. D. Phillips, "Emerging Technologies for Making Decisions," New Direc-
tions in Psychology: II (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1965), pp. 261-325. 
W. Edwards and L. D. Phillips, "Man as a Transducer for Probabilities in Bayesian 
Command and Control Systems," Human Judgments and Optimality (New York: Wiley, 
1964), pp. 360-401. W. Edwards, L. D. Phillips, W. L. Hays and B. C. Goodman, 
"Probabil ist ic Information Processing Systems: Design and Evaluation," IEEE Trans-
actions on Systems Science and Cybernetics (1968), Vol. SSC-4, pp. 248-265. 
13 Edwards, "Conservatism in Human Information Processing," pp. 17-52. 
1 4 See, for example, William F. Sharpe, Portfolio Theory and Capital Markets (New 
York: McGraw-Hil l Book Company, 1970). 
15 A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, "The Judgment of Probability by Retrieval and Con-
struction of Instances," Oregon Research Institute Research Bulletin (1971). 
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availability of instances is affected by such factors as recency, salience, and 
imaginability—all of which may not be related to the correct probability. 
In addition to this distortion, numerous other systematic biases in assess-
ments of probability were found such as misperceiving the probabilities of 
compound events (Cohen and Chesnick16 and Slovic17). Assessments of 
variability were found to be affected by the mean of the sequence and its 
regularity (Lathrop18). Thus people somehow judge absolute variability in 
terms of variability relative to the mean. Also, greater irregularity gives an 
illusion of greater variability. 
In addition to all the above, a great deal of experimental research on 
risk-taking behavior exists. This research may be relevant for investment 
decision-making and the information requirements for such decision-making. 
In this set of research (which is not discussed in this paper), subjects are 
asked to indicate their preferences and opinions among various gambles. 
Gambles are studied because they represent in an abstract form important 
aspects of real-life decisions. They contain elements such as probabilities, 
incentives and risks which are also the elements of real-life decisions. By 
using gambles, basic dimensions of risk situations can be manipulated, and 
hypotheses can be rigorously tested. Whether one can generalize that the 
results of such experiments simulate real-life decisions under uncertainty 
must be established by further research. 
To illustrate, Slovic19 found that perceived risk was not a function of the 
variance of a gamble. Instead riskiness was more likely to be determined 
by the probability of loss and the amount of loss. This result is congruent 
with Lorie's20 complaint that it was absurd to call a stock risky because it 
went up much faster than the market in some years and only as fast in other 
years, while a security that never varies in price is not risky at all—if the 
variance is used to define risk. If indeed descriptive models imply that either 
the amount of loss or the probability of loss is the main determinant of risk, 
would it not be concluded that at least from the standpoint of descriptive 
behavior, accounting information should concentrate on providing estimates 
for those two parameters? 
Summary and Conclusions 
In the above analysis, an attempt has been made to illustrate, with a few 
examples, some of the implications of the vast literature which describes 
1 6 J . Cohen and E. I. Chesnick, "The Doctrine of Psychological Chances," British 
Journal of Psychology (1970), Vol. 61, pp. 323-334. 
17 P. Slovic, "Manipulat ing the Attractiveness of a Gamble Without Changing Its 
Expected Value," Journal of Experimental Psychology (1969), Vol. 79, pp. 139-145. 
18 R. G. Lathrop, "Perceived Variabil ity," Journal of Experimental Psychology (1967), 
Vol. 73, pp. 498-502. 
19 P. Slovic, "The Relative Influence of Probabilit ies and Payoffs Upon Perceived 
Risk of a Gamble," Psychonomic Science (1967), Vol. 9, pp. 223-224. 
2 0 J. H. Lorie, "Some Comments on Recent Quantitative and Formal Research on the 
Stock Market," Journal of Business (1966), Vol. 39, Part II, pp. 107-110. 
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human behavior in relation to decision models that are actually used. If 
accounting information is to provide inputs to what people actually use, there 
is no doubt that a significant amount of research still remains to be conducted. 
Normative or prescriptive models are those which should be used, 
whereas descriptive models are those that are actually used. Given the cir-
cumstances underlying the task of the Study Group on the Objectives of 
Financial Statements, it is believed that an investigation of normative models 
utilizing accounting information deserves priority. 
First, the literature that is relevant to the investigation of descriptive 
models is both fragmented and indirect. Thus, to gather sufficient evidence 
that allows the formulation of a unified framework for descriptive models 
would be both difficult and overly time-consuming, thus placing severe limi-
tations on this approach. 
Second, the choice of models that are actually used may also be affected 
by the set of available information. Thus, to determine what information is 
required for a specified goal would require identifying the decision model 
employed; but, at the same time, the information provided to a decision-
maker may affect the decision model that is used. The circularity is particu-
larly crucial inasmuch as the Study Group is considering the possibility of 
enlarging or at least changing the available accounting information. There-
fore, the new information may change the descriptive models. 
These complexities make the exploration of descriptive models par-
ticularly difficult and lengthy. While such an investigation is potentially very 
useful, it is nevertheless suggested that primary emphasis be devoted to 
normative models at this stage. 
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